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Abstract
The Iranian plateau is an ideal area for investigating the relationship be? tween ecological and sociological
factors because of its stark aridity, on the one hand, and its historical role as a meeting place of ethnic and
cultural movements on the other. The part of the plateau which forms the southeast corner of Persia is
particularly interesting from this point of view. Over an area of some 200,000 square kilometers the great
majority of the population, which numbers about half a million and includes both peasants and nomads, call
themselves Baluch. Most, but not all of them, speak a dialect of Baluchi as their native tongue, and practically
all adults speak it as a lingua franca. However, their political and social organization shows important
variations, and there are striking geographical variations in the country they inhabit. It is unusual to find such
wide variations among people who consider themselves one society. This paper shows how the variations in
political and social organization in the area may be related to variations in human ecology. I wish to
demonstrate that in this area of Persia, where political leadership relies on an income from settled agriculture,
there is a definite social differentiation into classes and cognatic values are given to kin relationships, whereas
leadership which relies primarily on nomadic pastoralism works through a structure of agnatic kin
relationships without class differentiation.
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 The Iranian plateau is an ideal area for investigating the relationship be?
 tween ecological and sociological factors because of its stark aridity, on
 the one hand, and its historical role as a meeting place of ethnic and
 cultural movements on the other. The part of the plateau which forms the
 southeast corner of Persia is particularly interesting from this point of view.
 Over an area of some 200,000 square kilometers the great majority of the
 population, which numbers about half a million and includes both peasants
 and nomads, call themselves Baluch. Most, but not all of them, speak a
 dialect of Baluchi as their native tongue, and practically all adults speak
 it as a lingua franca. However, their political and social organization shows
 important variations, and there are striking geographical variations in the
 country they inhabit. It is unusual to find such wide variations among people
 who consider themselves one society. This paper shows how the variations
 in political and social organization in the area may be related to variations
 in human ecology. I wish to demonstrate that in this area of Persia, where
 political leadership relies on an income from settled agriculture, there is a
 definite social differentiation into classes and cognatic values are given
 to kin relationships, whereas leadership which relies primarily on nomadic
 pastoralism works through a structure of agnatic kin relationships without
 class differentiation.1
 The first section of the paper describes briefly the more significant
 aspects of the political and social organization, the differences in behavior
 relating to kinship, and the more important ecological factors. I also in?
 dicate the structural relationship between communities following different
 practices. The second section introduces two special cases which illustrate
 partial transitions between the two poles of structural variation. The final
 section seeks, by means of a diachronic model based on historical recon?
 struction, to show the dynamic relationship between the various differences
 in practice. The material, and to some extent the argument, is complicated
 by the fact that beginning in 1928 the central government has followed a
 formal policy of substituting its own administration for the traditional
 political organization. Until about fifteen years ago the effects of this policy
 seem to have been minimal, but during the last decade or so traditional




 The most conscious sociological divisions among the Persian Baluch are
 into tribes (zat), which are in many cases subdivided. Membership in a
 tribe is inherited patrilineally. A more significant?though less conscious?
 sociological division is into social categories, which, since they are the main
 factor in determining status, may be called classes. There is no word for
 class in Baluchi, only names for each social category, namely, ha\omzdt,
 baluch? shahri, and gholam. Secondary status or subclass distinctions are also
 made within these four broad classes, usually on the basis of tribe or
 subtribe. Class membership is also hereditary, but according to bilateral
 principles, and in cases of mixed parentage the lowest common denominator
 prevails. There are some cases where a tribe which is baluch or shahri by
 class has a subtribe descended from it which has become ha\omzdt, but
 apart from this possibility tribes do not overlap classes.
 A complication in the analysis of these class categories is that in general
 baluch and shahri cannot be said to stand in a hierarchical relationship. In
 any given community or area all the baluch may have a higher status
 rating than all the shahri, or vice versa, but it is more usual for some of the
 shahri tribes or subtribes to have a higher and some a lower status rating
 than the baluch of the area. In general, there is a wide status differentiation
 within the shahri class but much less differentiation within the baluch
 class.
 These terms signify basically occupational divisions, or divisions accord?
 ing to way of life and livelihood. The hdhpmzat class comprises all of a
 certain type of chief (ha\om) and their more immediate families. The
 baluch are nomadic pastoralists. The shahri are peasants?always possess?
 ing a certain amount of land and/or water, though often not enough to
 insure economic independence. The gholam were formerly slaves,3 and
 may now be generally characterized as a low social class with no property,
 usually distinguishable by their darker skin color. This situation obviously
 shows much resemblance to the caste system of the Indian subcontinent,
 and a similar situation in Swat has been directly compared to the caste
 system (Barth 1962). In our area, however, the situation is less conscious,
 and its justification is historical precedent rather than ritual or religious
 doctrine. Wherever possible, class difference and individual identity are
 expressed in tribal terms. But a tribe is often not a political or social
 unit. It may be spread through a number of villages or nomadic groups
 over a large area. Similarly, any one peasant community may be com?
 posed of members of one or many tribes, and of one or more classes,
 and a nomadic area controlled by one high-status family may contain
 groups from tribes which extend through several other areas. Conditions
 can occur whereby individuals or subtribes change their subclass, or even
 their class, over a period of time, but this is rare. Intermarriage?at least
 between the three higher classes?is not so rare, though a girl should
 never marry down, and it is unheard of for a ha\omzdt girl to marry
 outside her class.
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 The preferred marriage partner is a cousin, real or classificatory. People
 invariably claim to prefer the patrilateral parallel cousin when asked
 specifically, but practice shows no definite preference. The terminology
 distinguishes only between cousins born of aunts and cousins born of
 uncles, and makes no distinction at all between patrilateral and matri?
 lateral relatives. It is of the Eskimo type and is identical for all who
 speak Baluchi within the area. However, some tribes follow a strict
 patrilineal reckoning of descent, give no inheritance to daughters, and
 ascribe little importance to the origin of the mother, whereas others
 reckon descent bilaterally, give equal inheritance shares to sons and
 daughters, and ascribe equal importance to the origin of the mother.4
 Where the father is an important leader and it is likely that the eldest
 son will take his place, it is usual for the father to set aside an extra portion
 for him before the general division of the inheritance. This must be
 done with the consent of the other sons and daughters, and is known
 as mirwandi, which may be roughly translated as the "leadership share."
 Such leaders, even though their kinship practice may be entirely cognatic,
 always remember their agnatic genealogy back to the ancestor who brought
 the family into the area. This is considered a factor contributing to the
 legitimacy of a leader's authority.
 The highest position of political authority was that of ha\om. A ha\om
 was a member of the hakpmzat class who controlled an agricultural
 center. The term was in origin usurped from the Persian administration
 before the end of the last century?possibly much earlier?and meant
 "governor." It is now strictly speaking obsolete, because the government
 no longer allows any formal recognition of the chiefs' status, but it
 continues to be used colloquially. Although the position depended to a
 large extent on the possession of certain personal qualities, it was inherited
 ideally, though by no means always in fact, by the eldest son from a wife
 of the same zat or, failing that, from the same class. Before the Persian
 government took over the effective administration of the area, each hakpm
 had a fort in the main agricultural center under his control. His income
 depended more on what he could control than on what he owned. It
 consisted of:
 (1) The produce of land personally owned by him. This was worked by
 his own gholam, who received their keep, and/or sometimes local
 shahri who took a share of the harvest or some other compensation
 such as use of the ha\om\ water for their own land.
 (2) A tithe {dah-yal() on all agricultural produce of the shahri whom
 he controlled. These included all those in his center and those in a
 hinterland which varied according to his strength and prestige.
 (3) Service {sren-bandi) from all baluch who acknowledged his position.
 This could take many forms, as required, but was generally military or
 quasi-military.
 (4) A tax {maliyat) from both shahri and baluch. This was in origin
 the tax due to the central government, but it was usurped by the ha\om
 with the title.
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 The ha\om no longer, of course, has any legal right to the last three
 of these items any more than to the title, but the concepts are still
 valid and the practices are still occasionally found. In particular, within
 the conceptual framework of sren-bandi, the baluch are always ready to
 carry messages or run errands for the hd\om. It is evident from the
 foregoing list that the hd\om relied basically on a subject peasant popula?
 tion for their income, and on allegiance from nomadic pastoralists for
 their physical strength.
 Not all communities, however, were involved with hd\om, and some
 were involved only indirectly. Another type of leader is called sarddr.
 No class distinction exists between a sarddr and his following. He is always
 therefore either a shahri or a baluch, and thus by definition a class below
 a hahpm? He is ideally the senior member of the senior family of a
 tribe or group of subtribes, or in some cases of a community including
 representatives of different tribes. Where the tribe or community led by
 a sarddr also owed allegiance to a hd\om, as in perhaps the majority of
 cases, the ha\om would confirm the appointment of the sarddr by
 "tying on the turban," and in some cases he was able to influence
 the decision between rival candidates. Ideally the position of sarddr is
 inherited in a similar manner to that of hd\om, and personal qualities
 are an important factor in both cases. The qualification of descent on the
 mother's side is probably less important for the sarddr than for the
 hd\om, but this is difficult to confirm since there is less polygyny in
 sarddr families, and where it occurs there is less class difference between
 wives of a sarddr than between those of a ha\om.
 There are also communities which have no connection with either a
 hd\om or a sarddr and are led by a \amash. Whereas the term hd\om
 is an Arabic word adopted from Persian during the last century, and
 sarddr came from Persian probably not very much earlier, \amdsh comes
 from Brahui?a language of the Dravidian family, still spoken by minor?
 ity groups, which almost certainly preceded Baluchi in the area. Originally
 it meant "greybeard." Now it has both an absolute and a relative usage.
 The politically senior man in any group, whether temporary or permanent,
 is referred to as the \amash of that group. Otherwise a \amash is any
 man who has the means and personal qualities to take on the responsibility
 of informal political representation for any number of other people, and
 in this sense the term may also be applied to sarddr, hdkpm, and certain
 religious figures who seek to wield temporal authority. All men require
 the political representation of a \amdsh, who may be dependent on a
 sarddr, or on a hdhpm, or in certain rare cases may maintain freedom of
 action and be the paramount authority in a small area. A sarddr may be
 independent, or dependent on a hd\om.
 As a general rule, it may be said that people of the shahri and
 hdkpmzdt classes are invariably cognatic, and that all baluch communities
 which have a traditional relationship with a hd\om also tend to be
 cognatically organized, whereas baluch tribes which have remained in?
 dependent of hd\om are patrilineal.
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 The basic means of livelihood, or subsistence techniques, in Persian Balu-
 chistan vary between agriculture and pastoralism. But there is also a varia?
 tion in the main domestic animal relied on (usually the camel or the goat), in
 staple crops (wheat, dates, rice, sorghum, beans), and in methods of irriga?
 tion. The variation in types of environment is even greater; for instance, the
 highest peak in the area has an elevation of more than 13,000 feet, whereas
 the lowest plains are at sea level. For the purposes of this article, however,
 the whole range of variation in environment and human ecology can be
 accounted for by applying the following three parameters: (1) the availabil?
 ity of water for agricultural use; (2) the level of technology at the command
 of the people who would use this water; (3) the coincidence of this water
 with cultivable soil.
 Throughout the area direct rainfall is of negligible value, but one of the
 most important sources of water for irrigation is the run-off and wadi flood-
 ing which result from rainfall. The rainfall of a whole catchment basin is
 gathered by the nature of the terrain itself, with little or no human assis?
 tance, and is directed along with its invaluable sediment on to prepared
 fields. However, although a considerable volume of water is thus made
 available, the supply is extremely irregular and therefore does not in general
 support permanent settlement. In some parts wells are used, operated by
 hand by means of counterpoised water-lifts. In places where there is a shallow
 water table with a large catchment basin these can be reasonably reliable, but
 they nevertheless do not provide enough water to justify permanent agricul?
 tural settlement. In the mountain ranges which cross the southern part of the
 area many of the larger river beds in places retain flowing water throughout
 the year. Several of the agricultural centers of the area lie on such rivers, uti-
 lizing the alluvium which the river has deposited in a bend of its course. The
 larger settlements invariably contain the ruins of a fort and the residence of a
 hd\omzat family.
 There is one other method of obtaining water for irrigation which is used
 in the area, and this requires a much higher level of technological achieve?
 ment than the methods mentioned so far. The Iranian plateau is the home of
 the qandt system,6 but there are relatively few qandt in Persian Baluchistan,
 and so far as I could ascertain none of them were dug by Baluch. The great
 advantage of a good qandt is that, once the capital investment has been made,
 the owner commands a continuous and reliable flow of water for irrigation
 in return for a relatively small annual outlay on maintenance and repair. A
 large proportion of the settled agriculture on the Iranian plateau would have
 been impossible (before the introduction of motor pumps) without qandt. In
 Persian Baluchistan wherever there are old qandt (with the exception of one
 small region?Khash?where the agriculture was for some time controlled by
 non-Baluch) a hd\omzdt family is associated with them, and there is con?
 sequently class differentiation in the community which lives off them.
 In terms of the three parameters, the whole of Persian Baluchistan may be
 divided into regions which support a certain amount of settled agriculture
 and regions which support only varying numbers of (nomadic) pastoralists.
 Traditional settled agriculture is in most cases accompanied by the presence
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 or control of a hd\omzat family. One of the best ways of initiating settled
 agriculture on any scale in the area is to construct qandt. But qanat are not
 constructed by Baluch: Persian experts have to be brought in from the north
 or northwest.
 Special Cases
 Two special cases show partial transitions between the structural variants
 described above. The first of these concerns the people who call themselves
 Jadgal and some other closely affiliated tribes which together make up the
 population of the extreme southeastern corner of Persian Baluchistan, just
 off the plateau on the coastal plain by the Gulf of Oman and the border with
 Pakistan. The Jadgal claim to have immigrated from Sind some ten genera?
 tions ago. Though used by other Baluch as a tribal appellation, the name is
 really a collective linguistic term which covers a number of tribes who speak
 Jadgali, a language derived from Sindhi (though all male adults are also bi?
 lingual in Baluchi). Even though they retain an alien language, they are
 fully accepted as Baluch and call themselves Baluch in any larger context.
 The hahpmzdt family of this region is of the same origin but is now closely
 intermarried with neighboring ha\omzat families to the north and west, and
 its leading members no longer speak Jadgali.
 The ecology of the region is unique in Persia. The broad, flat plain is
 composed of layer upon layer of rich alluvial soil, brought down from the
 mountains by irregular flash floods. The water table is too deep to be accessi?
 ble, even for modern motor pumps, so that regular irrigation is impossible.
 The people now depend on agriculture (irrigated from irregular flood
 water) and animal husbandry to an almost equal degree. Their flocks in?
 clude sheep, goats, camels, cows, and water buffaloes, and a number of horses
 are still kept for riding purposes. The economy is, therefore, an unusually
 diversified one.
 However, the leading branch of the hd\omzat family now relies entirely on
 agriculture and no longer has any permanent residential center in the plain.
 There are two obvious and equally valid reasons for this. First, the rivers in
 the region have been cutting back rapidly during the last few decades, with
 the result that large areas of land that were previously intensively cultivated
 are now left without access to flood water. At the same time, there have been
 long periods of drought. Second, intermarriage of the leading members of
 the hdkpmzat (whose family name is Sardarzai) with neighboring hdhomzdt
 on bilateral principles has provided them with good land in distinct neigh?
 boring ecological regions and with a following in these regions, for on the
 mother's side they now belong to the ruling ha\omzdt families there as well.
 The Jadgal, exclusive of the Sardarzai, are strictly and exclusively patrilineal.
 Not only do they give no inheritance to daughters, but they regard sons-in-
 law as outsiders and never quite accept them into the in-group. Their suspi?
 cion of in-laws is carried to the extent that they refuse to intermarry with
 non-Jadgal.
 It appears that the Sardarzai were already differentiated from their people
 when they arrived in the region. After a while, fighting with the previous
 inhabitants of the region ended in a settlement and in intermarriage between
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 the leading family of the immigrants and the hdkpmzat of the previous pop?
 ulation. The Sardarzai were thus drawn into the cognatic network of ha\om-
 zdt intermarriage which extends today over most of Persian Baluchistan, be?
 came automatically members of the hd\omzdt class, and thus gradually im?
 ported this class distinction and gave it validity among their own people. At
 the same time, because of the cognatic values of the people with whom they
 intermarried, they made their own economic (and political) position more
 secure by acquiring agricultural property through matrilateral inheritance in
 a another ecological region.
 The leaders of the Sardarzai family have been conscious of their change to
 a cognatic orientation toward kin relationships. The reaction of the present
 ha\om and his father has been to attempt to persuade the Jadgal both to
 intermarry with the neighboring tribes and to accord inheritance to daugh?
 ters?but so far completely without success, even though such a course would
 give them shares in a distinct ecological region and to provide them with
 some security against drought in their own region. It is unfortunately no
 longer possible to judge whether this reaction of the hd\om was due to po?
 litical awareness or to subconscious guilt for having deviated from the old
 ways. Their present stand is on justice and good. But this is also an im?
 ported value, for it is among the Baluch, not among the Jadgal, that there is
 a strong, positive brother-sister relationship.
 The second case concerns two large regions in Persian Baluchistan which
 are peopled by baluch who have remained for the most part aloof and inde?
 pendent from any hd\omzdt families, and are led by sardar of their own. One
 of these regions provides particularly interesting material in the present con?
 text. It is a large depression in the west of the area, generally called Jaz Mur-
 ian. The main tribe in this region is the Bameri, and for as far back as they
 can remember (which is only seven generations, probably marking the date
 of their entry into the region) the sardar of the tribe has been a member of
 the Nawabi family.
 The Bameri claim that when they entered the depression there were no
 qandt there. Those which now exist belong exclusively to the Nawabi and,
 according to local tradition, were started by that family at about the begin?
 ning of this century. Apart from the qandt, a number of districts are culti?
 vated by means of hand-operated wells. Whereas the lands irrigated from
 qandt belong to the sardar family and are worked by serfs and sharecroppers,
 the land irrigated from wells is owned and worked by individual free baluch.
 Moreover, generally and ideally land irrigated from wells provides only a
 supplementary source of livelihood.
 The principal means of livelihood of the baluch of this depression is the
 camel; traditionally they have bred and trained what is probably the fastest
 and best riding camel in Persia. Since many of the wells are used solely for
 the watering of camels, and since even those who use them for cultivation
 still rely on camel rearing for their main livelihood, it seems likely that the
 wells were developed primarily as a means of watering the camels, rather
 than for agriculture. This ecological situation is quite different from the re?
 mainder of the area.
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 Until this century, therefore, there was no settled agriculture in the depres?
 sion, and the region controlled by the sarddr exhibited no class differentiation
 except for the limited use of gholam. Since the qanat were constructed, a
 class distinction has arisen between gholam and sharecroppers, the econom?
 ically independent baluch, and the landowning and ruling Nawabi. The
 Nawabi have sold their herds and have intermarried with the (non-Baluch)
 landowners in the Narmashir region to the northwest, but they still build no
 permanent dwellings.
 Obviously the Nawabi today are in a social and political position equiva?
 lent to that of the ha\omzat in the remainder of the area, and the sarddr of
 the Bameri is comparable to a ha\om elsewhere. But he is not accorded the
 status or the title formally. This is not surprising, for the term is now after
 all an anachronism. It would, for instance, be illegal for him to attempt to
 collect dah-ya\ or mdliydt (though the more informal collections formerly al?
 lowed to sarddr are still sometimes made despite their illegality). Similarly,
 it is understandable that the ha\omzat in the remainder of the area are not
 quick to recognize a new member to their class. In the case of the Sardarzai,
 such recognition was forced on the hd\omzdt by military defeat, which also
 brought about intermarriage. Nevertheless, I have on one occasion heard
 the present sarddr addressed as hd\om by a Bameri sharecropper. Further?
 more, the Barakzai hdkpmzdt to the east have given a wife to the Nawabi.
 The mother of this woman was not ha\omzdt, and so the woman herself,
 though Barakzai, did not have ha\omzdt class status, but the marriage is
 nevertheless significant in the present context.
 Another geographical factor has been operative in this case. The whole of
 Baluchistan, in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as in Persia, has tended his?
 torically to form a cul de sac. It is for the most part surrounded by desert on
 one side and an inhospitable coast on the other. The fact that it has never
 supported a large city, coupled with its general isolation, has meant that it
 has always been difficult to control, and that routes through it have seldom
 been secure. Until the 1930s the main route of access to the area for Persian
 government officials lay through the Jaz Murian depression, and the Persians
 always used a fort at the eastern end of the depression as their administrative
 center, when they could hold it. This meant that the Bameri, and particu?
 larly their leading family, the Nawabi, who controlled the route, were more
 exposed to contact and more open to influence from the rest of Persia than
 was the remainder of the area, and this probably helps to account for the
 construction of the qanat at the beginning of the present century. A few dec?
 ades after the construction of the qanat the new Pahlavi regime in Teheran
 (1925- ) sought to consolidate its position in the area by building a new
 provincial city at a site some 400 kilometers to the north. This resulted in the
 diversion of all through traffic away from the depression, and no motor road
 has yet been built through it. This has produced the paradox, that while the
 greater part of Persian Baluchistan has become progressively less isolated
 particularly during the last decade, the Jaz Murian depression and its inhab?
 itants the Bameri have suffered a net increase in isolation. This has allowed
 the Nawabi to take full advantage of the change in their situation at a time
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 when hd\om in the remainder of the area were being shorn of their privi?
 leges by the encroaching Persian administration. This is but one of many
 instances on the Iranian plateau of the effect that the choice of routes for
 motor roads, among other aspects of policies of modernization, may have on
 traditional balances of power and economic prosperity.
 Historical Reconstruction and a Model
 Baluch cultural values are basically nomadic pastoral values. A rich cor-
 pus of poetry exists in the Baluchi language which gives expression to these
 values. It is assumed that the people who brought the name Baluch to the
 area also brought the language. They were certainly pastoralists. There is no
 means of telling whether their descendants are among the present inhabi?
 tants of the area. The historical information which can be gleaned from the
 poetry belongs to a much later period.
 The present population of the area may be conveniently divided into (1)
 the tribes who think they have always been there or profess not to know their
 origin, (2) those who claim to be by origin Arabs descended from Hamza,
 the paternal uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, and to have fought beside his
 grandson Husein at Karbala before migrating eastwards (though these are
 not Shi'a), and (3) those who claim a much more recent, and more likely,
 origin in Persia, Afghanistan, eastern Arabia, or the Indian subcontinent.
 Attention has already been drawn to the alien origin of most of the Baluchi
 terms introduced above. We may surmise that they were assimilated either
 because they were prestigious (e.g., ha\om), or because they were brought
 into the society by high-status immigrants. Both oral tradition and such writ?
 ten historical evidence as exists indicate that the society has constantly as?
 similated immigrant groups, and that they have often entered the area with
 high status. It is to be expected that the assimilation of alien groups into the
 ruling class would bring with it new political concepts.
 The model which is constructed below?which is similar to that expounded
 by Ibn Khaldun with reference to Islamic history up to the fourteenth cen?
 tury?is an attempt to complete the picture by suggesting the dynamic rela?
 tionship between the two basic modes of livelihood, the two poles of political
 organization and kin behavior, and the various types of environment.
 For reasons which concern their area of origin, a tribal, pastoral group of
 people invades a settled, agricultural area. They include a nuclear group
 which claims patrilineal descent from a common ancestor and recognizes
 within itself a dominant line or family, which, however, can only retain this
 position so long as it "earns" it by the quality of its leadership. Finding a
 power vacuum, owing to the weakness of the political structure and author?
 ity in the settled area it invades, it stays there and becomes the dominant
 power in the area. The leading family of the invaders becomes the focus of
 power in the settled area, and therefore the de facto rulers of both peoples:
 those that entered the area with it?the pastoralists?and those who were in
 the area when it came?the peasants. There may of course be more than one
 such family, in which case the area becomes divided into their respective
 areas of influence and political control.
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 Having become the focus of a more numerous and more diversified peo?
 ple, the leading family also increases in power and wealth, for it now has the
 use of agricultural as well as pastoral resources. The tribal following, how?
 ever, does not become either more powerful or richer, since its social position
 has basically not changed; it follows the same way of life and feels the same
 relationship with its leading family as before. On the other hand, the settled
 people are now subordinate to the leading family of the invaders, and the
 structural distance between them and their new rulers is much greater than
 that which prevailed between the leading family and its tribal following.
 Finally, the direct relationship between the settled and the tribal people is not
 defined.
 Before the invasion the settled people are unlikely to have had the same
 close relationship with their political leaders as the tribal following had with
 its dominant line. Being divided among a number of small villages over a
 large area, they are likely to have been politically subject to a "superstructure"
 of some kind, whether in the form of one single dominant "dynastic" family
 or of an oligarchy of several interrelated families (cf. Parsons 1964: 162-163;
 Spooner 1965: 23). In either case, the structural distance between the set?
 tled people and its rulers is likely to have been greater than that between the
 pastoralists and their leaders. In the new situation, therefore, as far as the
 settled people are concerned one superstructure is simply substituted for an?
 other, making little or no real difference to the social and political position
 of the great majority of them. The leaders who constituted their former su?
 perstructure will have been either killed, driven out, or assimilated with
 them. In the latter case, some of them may assume the role of popular leaders
 of their former people under the new superstructure. This is not so for the
 tribal following. For them the first main result of the new situation is to
 enhance their pride through contact with another stratum of people who are
 socially inferior to them (a) by occupation, for pastoral values are dominant,
 and (b) by structural distance from the rulers.
 However, such a situation cannot be static, for it has enhanced the political
 and economic position of the leaders more than that of the following, with
 the result that the original tribal organization and the "group feeling" (cf.
 Ibn Khaldun 1958: passim) of the tribe is disturbed. The structural distance
 between the leading family and its tribal following automatically increases
 because of the change in the economic and political basis of that relationship.
 And the leading family tends to become "dynastic." Whatever may have
 been the situation before the invasion, the new composite population of the
 area is potentially divided into three social categories or classes: the dynastic
 family, the nomadic pastoralists, and the settled peasants. The relationship
 between the first and last of these is politically stable, but the relationships
 between the second and each of the other two tend to be unstable since
 neither is properly defined politically nor firmly based economically.
 In the new situation the settled people are a source of agricultural wealth
 and labor for the dynastic family, while the tribal following is a source of
 military strength and, secondarily, of pastoral products. At first, the tribal fol?
 lowing is by far the more important to the dynastic family because the latter
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 stands in need of it as a source of strength to consolidate its position. But as
 its position becomes firmer, it looks more and more to the settled population
 as its main source of wealth.
 Growing interest in settled agriculture, and therefore also in the settled
 agricultural people, causes the dynastic family next to change its military
 outlook. Whereas before it had fought for and defended movable property
 only, it is now interested in defending immovable plots of cultivable land
 and crops and peasants. With this in mind it begins to feel the nakedness
 and insecurity of nomad life and starts to build forts, or take over and de?
 velop existing ones, for its protection and defense in the main agricultural
 centers. It takes some time before the dynastic family becomes actually set?
 tled, but the forts are a tangible symbol for all three classes of the growing
 ties between the dynastic family and the settled people.
 Tribal Nomenclature and Identity
 The model is capable of being developed further up to a cyclical stage of
 re-invasion (cf. Ibn Khaldun), with modifications to account for the new
 types of social change resulting from the intervention of the nationalist
 modernizing state machine. However, such further development is not re?
 quired in connection with the argument of the present paper, and is left for a
 future publication. The remainder of this section discusses certain questions
 of tribal nomenclature and identity, and is parallel to the model.
 Before arriving in the area the tribal people will have had a name?
 either the original name of the agnatic nuclear group applied por excellence
 to the dynastic family or the original name of an eponymous ancestor of the
 dynastic family line applied by the tribal following to themselves, thus dis?
 tinguishing them from other peoples by a name denoting their group alle?
 giance. In either case this name is now gradually becoming applied to the
 settled people as well as the tribal following, i.e., in effect to the realm of the
 dynastic family. In short, the political unit takes its name from its dominant
 element, and the remainder of the population loses its ethnic or cultural
 identity, and thereby becomes fully assimilated.
 Such is the case with regard to the situation within the society. The external
 situation, however, is somewhat different. The Persian Baluch are a political
 community to the extent that traditionally no tribe or group allowed them?
 selves to become subordinated to non-Baluch. The concept of political unity
 under one (Baluch) leader has probably never had any general validity
 among them. What, then, is a Baluch? The simplest definition is that a
 Baluch is a man who calls himself "Baluch," since only the Baluch are proud
 of being Baluch. We can only improve on this by introducing the following
 hypothesis, which, though it is probably not susceptible of proof, takes ac?
 count of the available evidence and throws some light on the situation under
 discussion.
 The origin and etymology of the word "Baluch" are unknown.7 Among
 the Baluch today it is used, as we have already seen, simply to mean "tent-
 dwelling pastoralist." It is significant that it is used with the same meaning in
 Persian in northeastern Persia. The words \urd and lur are reported to be
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 similarly used among the Kurds and Lurs respectively, and similar usage of
 the word arab is also found among the Arabs. In some other parts of the
 Iranian world pairs of terms are found which are used to distinguish no?
 madic from settled people within a given area irrespective of ethnic or other
 factors. Such terms are often treated as though they have purely ethnic sig?
 nificance. The hypothesis I wish to suggest is that such words in general, and
 "Baluch" in particular, are in origin (so far as sociological rather than philo-
 logical origin is concerned) terms adopted by settled populations to refer to
 bands of nomadic pastoralists who roamed the uncultivated land in their vi?
 cinity, regardless of their supposed racial origin or the language they spoke.
 As such "Baluch" would be a blanket "supra-tribal" term with associations of
 the town's fear and contempt of the wilderness. Because of the acknowledged
 cultural and religious superiority of the towns, it was natural for the nomads
 to accept the name (though without the associations) by which the towns-
 people designated them, thus unconsciously assimilating themselves to the
 town's conception of them. The nomads may also have their own term of
 contempt for the townspeople; for instance, for nontribal Persians Baluchi
 uses gajar, from the name of the last Persian dynasty. However, the towns?
 people would only assimilate themselves to the tribal conception of them if a
 tribal invasion were to conquer the towns and give rise to a tribal ruling class,
 as we have shown above.
 Baluch society has retained a large percentage of nonnomads8 without los-
 ing the pastoral emphasis in its system of values. There is evidence to sug?
 gest that at an earlier stage in the development of the society the peasants
 were in a situation similar to helots. All the major agricultural centers of the
 area bear names which we know have remained unchanged since a time
 well before any people called Baluch arrived in the area. All other toponymy
 is predominantly Baluchi, and the exceptions are Persian and easily ex?
 plained (cf. Spooner 1969). The pastoral invaders were interested in control?
 ling the land and enjoying its produce, not in owning it. Even today land
 ownership is irrelevant to social status. There are several cases where the
 largest landowners (apart from the hd\om) have a very low social status but
 a tribal name which means something like "chief." Such a situation is very
 difficult to explain unless such people do in fact represent the remnants of a
 previous agricultural population. They are now all fully assimilated as equal
 members of the society?as Baluch, though not as baluch. All named tribal
 groups in the Iranian cultural area (e.g., Bakhtiari, Qashqai, and Turkoman)
 include nonnomads, and it is natural that a term should be required to differ-
 entiate between nomadic and nonnomadic within the named group, what?
 ever the origin of the latter. As we have seen, the same term is used in many
 cases for the nomadic as for the whole tribal group, and another is found for
 the nonnomads within it. In general, therefore, given the special ecological
 and historical factors of the Iranian cultural area, it would seem that within a
 given area the townspeople name the tribal group, whereas within the tribal
 group the nomads name the nonnomads. At each step the names are ac?
 cepted with a certain degree of cultural inferiority.
 The shift to cognatic principles of kinship, marriage, and inheritance
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 helped to unify and fuse the two elements of the new society, the peasants
 and the pastoral immigrants. The horizontal network of cognatic intermar-
 riage spread through most of the area, providing political alliance and agri?
 cultural security by the dispersal of landowning interests through two or
 more ecological regions. Only in two regions which remained almost en?
 tirely pastoral?the Jaz Murian, discussed above, and the Sarhadd in the
 north of the area?was there little or no conversion from agnatic principles.
 The nomadic pastoralists of these two regions retained their independence
 from the agricultural hd\om by keeping themselves apart, rather than by
 superior strength. An endogamous, agnatic system of marriage and inheri?
 tance insured their independence, whereas the only use that the originally
 patrilineal ha\om retained for their agnatic genealogy was as a symbolic
 justification of their legitimacy.
 NOTES
 i. Between 1963 and 1967 I spent some fourteen months in Persian Baluchistan and
 most of the remainder of the time in Tehran in touch with informants. I take this
 opportunity of expressing my gratitude to St. Antony's College, Oxford, the British
 Academy, and the British Institute of Persian Studies for the financial and other as?
 sistance which made this possible, and to Dr. Rodney Needham for his generous
 guidance and encouragement.
 2. Used in this sense the term is italicized with a small initial letter throughout. The
 distinction between Baluch and baluch is discussed in the final section. Briefly, all are
 Baluch in a context which includes non-Baluch; within Baluch society the term denotes
 this particular class.
 3. This status was legally abolished when the administration of the area was formally
 taken over by the central government in 1928. The only practical difference this made
 at the time was to enable them to leave Baluch society if they wished. Those that now
 remain are almost exclusively black and/or Negroid, and an effective color bar makes
 it difficult for them to improve their status either within the area or elsewhere. Before
 1928 they were used as either domestic servants, agricultural serfs, or militia. The
 chiefs can no longer keep a militia, and they can no longer support many domestic
 servants. Apart from those who have moved to Karachi or the other side of the Persian
 Gulf as coolie laborers, many have been settled by their owners on part of their estate,
 often on a sharecropping basis.
 4. With regard to inheritance it should be mentioned that the Baluch are Sunni Muslims
 of the Hanafi rite, and that according to Islamic law a daughter should receive half
 the share of a son, while certain provisions are also made for other relatives. There are
 a few small communities in the area, invariably with especial claims to religiosity,
 which keep strictly to these precepts. Inheritance practices also differ according to the
 type of property, but this will be dealt with in another publication.
 5. To avoid confusion it should be noted that the general use of the term sardar out?
 side the area under discussion, in both Baluchi and Persian, is to denote absolute or
 paramount tribal chiefs, similar to those here called ha\om.
 6. A good account is given in Wulff (1966: 249). Briefly, a qanat is an underground
 channel constructed to connect a reliable aquifer with cultivable land lower in the
 valley.
 7. According to the general consensus of opinion the name "Baluch" and the Baluchi
 language were brought into the area from the northwest in the eleventh century,
 though the evidence is scanty. Most of what is now called Baluchistan probably did not
 become uniformly Baluch or Baluchi-speaking until much later. Practically nothing is
 known of what was displaced.
 8. There are no figures. The proportion has probably varied constantly, since adverse
 circumstances, such as drought, tended to affect the baluch and drive them into tem-
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 porary or permanent exile before the shahri. The proportion of peasants to nomads is
 now probably more than half and increasing because of the bias of government develop?
 ment programs.
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